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EDITORIAL
Germany Outbreak of Escherichia Coli, Lessons to Be 
Learned 
 
 
One of the most severe outbreaks of Escherichia coli 
has recently occurred in Europe.
1 The epidemic was 
started in Germany but now has affected more than 
16 countries with more than 3200 reported diseased 
and 35 death cases.
2,3 Of the reported 812 cases with 
hemolytic uremic syndrome (HUS), 23 died with a 
case fatality of 2.8%. Death toll among 2443 infected 
patients with Enterohemorrhagic E. coli (EHEC) in-
fection not complicated with HUS was 12, indicating 
a case fatality rate of nearly 0.5%.
2 Most cases were 
from Germany, but 15 other countries including 13 
European member states and USA and Canada also 
reported occurrence of the disease.
2 The second coun-
try with the highest number of reported cases was 
Sweden followed by Denmark.
2 Globally, all but 5 
cases occurred among people who had recently trav-
eled to Germany or were living there. Except one 
Swedish patient who died with HUS, all other 34 re-
ported deaths were from Germany including 22 pa-
tients with HUS and 12 others with EHEC infection 
without HUS. Most cases were female and the highest 
attack rate was in age range of 20-49 years and less 
than 15% of cases aged less than 20 years old. These 
figures are different from the previous epidemics of 
HUS and EHEC which had a higher attack rate in 
youngsters.
2,4 
The causative organism was found to be en-
teroaggregative verocytotoxin-producing E. coli 
(EAggEC VTEC) O104:H4 bacterium.
2,5 This strain 
is quite unusual and it seems to be an hybrid strain 
between a Shiga-toxin-producing E. coli (STEC) 
strain and an enteroaggregative E. coli strain.
5 
HUS is usually complicated in 6-9% of infections 
with O157:H7 EHEC, the most common strain of 
EHEC reported previously, but in this epidemic, the 
reported incidence was nearly 25%.
2,4 Although a re-
ferral bias is possible, but it is quite clear that the oc-
currence of HUS is much higher with this unusual 
strain. For 0157:H7 strain, the most common vehicle 
for transmission is undercooked beef specially the 
ground beef.
4 This O104:H4 strain was found to be 
transmitted by bean and seed sprouts as was reported 
by German authorities in June 10
th.
2 Overall, it seems 
that we are now confronted with a more aggressive 
organism with somehow different microbiological 
and clinical characteristics. Detailed studies are under-
way and probably we would hear more on differences of 
this emergent strain with its predecessor strains.
3  
The most challenging question right now is why 
this epidemic was reported so late to international 
health authorities.According to German Federal 
Agency for Disease Surveillance, the first cases were 
hospitalized in Germany in May 1
st.
3 But it was only 
3 weeks later when the possibility of an epidemics of 
E. coli was reported to European Center for Disease 
Prevention and Control.
3 Although the unusual nature 
of this strain both in microbiologic characteristics and 
clinical presentations as discussed above was blamed for 
this unacceptable delay, the real problems should be 
sought elsewhere. Absence of an active national 
authority for disease control is probably one of the weak 
points as was mentioned by some German scientists.
3  
The dissociation between health systems and disease 
surveillance organizations which is present in many 
countries is a persistent defect which makes repetition of 
this sad event quite possible everywhere and at anytime. 
When there is no systematic connection between pro-
viders of medical care and the surveillance organizations 
and when there is no clear definition of the level of haz-
ards which makes decisions mostly personal not evi-
dence based or targeted, it would not be rare to see this 
amount of delay in reporting.  
According to International Health Regulations 
(IHR) approved by World Health Assembly, all 
member states of World Health Organization (WHO) 
have to strengthen their existing public health surveil-
lance and response.
6 The main purpose of IHR is to 
help the international community to prevent and re-
spond to acute public-health risks that have the poten-
tial to cross borders and threaten people worldwide. 
IHR entered to force in June 15
th, 2007. Now on the 
4
th anniversary of this important event in collective 
global health action, it is a good time to reemphasize 
the importance of strengthening the national health 
surveillance systems. 
A pyramidal model of integrated organized and 
comprehensive approach which is flexible, continu-
ous and dynamic which makes possible to have a col-
lective action of all players from community, gov-
ernment and international agencies is a good model Germany outbreak of E. coli 
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for effective surveillance and response.
7 Through this 
model, better inter and intra-sectoral collaboration in 
surveillance and response can become a reality. 
In countries with a national primary health care sys-
tem like public health network in Iran, the effective-
ness of this primary health care based system of sur-
veillance has been shown in control of both communi-
cable as well as non-communicable diseases.
7,8 We do 
not want to neglect the importance of molecular tech-
niques in the surveillance of microbial diseases like the 
current EHEC epidemics but if the starting point for a 
surveillance system becomes the primary health care 
system, then we would see more rapid detection of 
outbreaks and more rapid responses. This also could 
get a better support from the community as well as the 
non-governmental organizations. 
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